Perspectives (1969-1979)
Volume 7
Number 2 Fall

Article 5

1975

The Academic Meritocracy: Its Origins and Future
David Katz
Michigan State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/perspectives
Part of the Higher Education Commons, and the Liberal Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Katz, David (1975) "The Academic Meritocracy: Its Origins and Future," Perspectives (1969-1979): Vol. 7 :
No. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/perspectives/vol7/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Western Michigan University at ScholarWorks at
WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Perspectives
(1969-1979) by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at
WMU. For more information, please contact wmuscholarworks@wmich.edu.

0

DOo

The Academic Meritocracy
By DAVID

KATI

"Virtue ," Emerson assures us, "is the only reward of virtue." Yet , as
every academic knows , this seemingly elementary axiom has long been
obsolete. Indeed , the very meaning of virtue has changed since Emerson's
day, when the concept referred to a quality of being acquired through
intense introspection and manifested in one's daily relations with others. As
currently defined in the academy virtue is simultaneously more tangible
and more prosaic. It is the status one acquires through the accumulation of
certain types of credits: assignment to prestigious committees, active
participation at professional meetings and , especially, a suitably impressive
list of publications . Quantity rather than quality of production has often
become the true foundation of virtue in academe as elsewhere in American
society. In the academic milieu, this principle sometimes assumes a stark
simplicity: one book , for example, may be "worth" an assistant
professorship ; two books , associate status; three books , the Nirvana of "flag
rank " and the envious glances of those further down the professorial
hierarchy .
Usually , however , the rules of the game are somewhat more complex.
The players , rather than striving to achieve explicit, pre-established performance criteria , actually compete against each other in a never ending
contest of one -upmanship. It is this ideal type meritocratic system (so
curiously reminiscent of the Soviet "socialist emulation" competitions, c.
1935) which now appears to prevail in most academic departments. The
purpose of this article is to briefly consider some of the historical and
sociological factors which help to account for the system's growth , pervasiveness and durability.
American entrance into the Second World War provides a logical
starting point for such an investigation. Until 1941 , American higher
education was basically a two-tiered arrangement consisting of a handful of
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"Establishment" institutions, which functioned as finishing schools for the
older segments of the upper- and upper-middle-classes, and a much larger
network of "provincial'' institutions, whose largely native-born, middleclass graduates staffed the lower echelons of the professions as well as
similar slots in the corporate and entrepreneurial business world. 1
The socio-economic status of the system's faculty generally
corresponded to that of their students, but there were significant differences
between the two groups. To borrow Robert Merton's famous typology,2 the
prewar professoriat contained an inordinate number of "ritualists" and
"rebels," i.e. , individuals who rejected the competitive and materialistic
values prevailing in the larger society. Adoption of this outsider role, which
like any form of deviance can be ascribed to various causes, had significant
psychological and materials costs, but it also had numerous compensations;
e.g., ample leisure for the cultivation of research interests as well as a
certain collective esprit, which developed easily within the confines of
relatively small, homogeneous academic communities. 3
Academe's isolation and gemeinshafthch environment were irrevocably
shattered by the war. For the first time in American history. academic
institutions were required to extensively synchronize their daily operations
with those of the larger society. "Establishment" and "provincial''
universities alike were rapidly transformed from intellectual enclaves into
scientific and intelligence bases mobilized to defend the nation.
This sudden and profound shift in academic-societal relations (symbolized most dramatically by the Manhattan Project) affected a major
change in the conventional conception of the academic and the academic's
conception of himself. Most importantly, opportunities for garnering
research funds and influence within powerful and hitherto inaccessible nonacademic circles encouraged some professors to shed their previous identities as marginal, cloistered and essentially passive individuals and to
assume a new role: that of the academic entrepreneur adept at dealing with
politicians, military brass and businessmen in the calculative , manipulative
style of the larger society. This radically revised self-image also carried over
into dealings with colleagues , who were now often perceived as actual or
potential rivals in a game of increasingly high stakes . To be a winner in that
game required not only a well developed political sense, but also a
demonstrated capacity for achieving "results," a criterion often measured in
terms of both quantity and quality of production. In short , by 1945, innovative academics were already acquiring the self-image and competitive
ethos which ideally characterize the members of a meritocracy.•
Postwar developments further accelerated the emergence of a fully
realized meritocratic system. Two factors were especially important in this
regard: increasingly generous outside support for university-based research ,
and the massification of higher education.
During the period 1945-1968, universities were fully integrated into a
new government-business -education axis , while federal support for research
was broadened into new domestic policy areas. This new arrangement was
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in marked contrast to academic-government cooperation in the same areas
during the Thirties. At that time, a small , elite "Brains Trust" of
"Establishment" professors, e.g., Columbia's Rexford Tugwell and A. A.
Berle, had entered government service to help plan New Deal social and
economic strategy. 5 In contrast, in the Fifties and Sixties, government
e ntered the universities to solicit expert guidance and research from a much
enlarged corps of domestic advisors. This process reached a climax of sorts
in the middle Sixties , when significant numbers of social scientists qua
policy advisors were inducted to fight the War on Poverty.
During the same period , another segment of the professoriat was being
mobilized to fight on America's "second front, " i.e. , the Cold War. One
can , in fact , trace a clear correlation between the shifting political focus of
that struggle and the federally funded research interests of American
political scientists specializing in foreign affairs, Basically, the following
distinct stages are discernible:
1. 1945 -1954 , the bipolar period of direct Soviet-American confrontation, during which institutional sub -units like the Russian Research
Center at Harvard received large government subsidies to study Soviet
society , strategy, and resources .
2. I 955-1961, the grand strategy era, marked by intense debate over
nuclear and conventional strategy options and the alleged American
scientific / technological inferiority uis a ui.s the Soviet Union. Witnessed the
emergence of prominent university and "think-tank" consultants, e.g.
Henry Kissinger and Herman Kahn , as well as massive increases in federal
support for research in the physical sciences.
3. 1962-1968 , the "pet it" strategy period, in which academics provided
political decision -makers with numerous studies on the causes of sociopolitical disequilibrium in the Third World.
The moral implications of these increasingly intimate governmentuniversity connections have been pondered by many observers; 6 the
meritocratic implications of the relationship have been relatively ignored.
Nevertheless , this much is clear; if World War II was the meritocracy's
" take-off ' phase , then the postwar era was the system's period of
maturation. The intersecting exigencies of international crisis and domestic
change encouraged the inclusion of an ever larger and more varied segment
of the professoriat within the system's orbit. Moreover, successive shifts in
gra ntor (i.e., government) areas of concern, especially but not exclusively in
the foreign policy field , stimulated a capacity for nimble adaptibility
among potential grantees. Finally , the uncertainty over future gr an tor
needs helped to heighten both anxiety and rivalry within professional ranks:
successful meritocratic competition increasingly required a keen awareness
of present and future grantor needs and a proven "track record," i.e., an
impressive bibliography, which could project the competitor into the front
ranks of those applying for research support.
Changes in the institutional relationship between government and
university thus helped to foster an ideal meritocratic climate characterized
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by insatiable status anxiety and an intensely competitive orientation. At the
same time, intra-institutional change - viz. , the massification of higher
education, coupled with the proliferation of new academic
specialties - increasingly inhibited communication within departments .
Under these conditions, the "clubby" ambience of prewar days could no
longer be sustained ; evaluation of professional competence and accomplishment became progressively more impersonal and quantitative as
the expanded professoriat itself became increasingly atomized and
specialized. The biblical injunction "Verily , ye shall know them by their
works" thus acquired a new and rather literal meaning for those who entered the academy after World War II.
Will the meritocracy survive in the years ahead? Until the late Sixties,
such a question would never have been raised: the steady growth of the
meritocratic system seemed assured; its harsh but seemingly equitable logic
was generally accepted , even by those whose mediocre talents and limited
competitive drive consigned them to the ultimo. Thu/es of academe.
Recently , however, there have been a number of new developments which
collectively pose a serious threat to the survival of meritocratic values. In
order of importance , these are:
1. the precipitous post -1968 decline in federal support for the natural
and social sciences . Availability of these research funds undoubtedly
stimulated academic productivity and competition in the 1942-1968 period .
Consequently, their loss has had some deleterious effect.
2. the impact of "affirmative action" and related policies , which,
whatever their normative validity, are in clear conflict with meritocratic
principles.
3. the virtual collapse of the academic job market in many fields. As a
result , large numbers of potential competitors have been dissuaded from
entering academe , while those already in it have found their upward
mobility blocked by restrictions on promotions and tenure. What is particularly disturbing is that the basic cause of the current crisis appears to be
structural in nature: viz . , the growing skepticism regarding the economic
value of traditional higher education.
Framed in this way, the outlook does indeed appear very bleak. Yet ,
these same factors, when analyzed from a somewhat different perspective ,
should forestall any premature conclusions about the meritocracy's imminent demise. For example , the current decline in federal support for
research and curriculum innovation may well be reversed by a new
Administration , especially one headed by a JFK-style reformer committed
to "excellence" and an experimental approach to the solution of social
problems. Similarly , proponents of "affirmative action" programs indignantly reject the suggestion that they are trying to destroy meritocratic
competition . In their view, quota systems and related devices are merely
designed to partially and temporarily suspend the rules of a game which has
been unfairly rigged against certain groups. The assumption is that women
and members of racial minorities, once assimilated into the competitive
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sys tem , will be quite capable of holding their own against their white male
counterparts. 7 Over the long term , then, "affirmative action" programs
could stimulate rather than enervate the meritocracy.
The unprecedented structural crisis besetting higher education may well
have the same invigorating effects, even though it has forced many highly
talented graduate students to seek non-academic employment. For those
already committed to academe, hard times and nebulous legislative
demands for "accountability" have combined to greatly intensify the
pressures for achievement. At many institutions, academics are no longer
competing for advancement and peer recognition; instead, they are
struggling for professional and economic survival. These higher stakes
should insure a comparably higher level of performance from most players
of the meritocratic game.
NOTES
l.

See , Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University (New
York, 1962) for a scholarly account of the development of higher
education prior to World War I.

2. Robert K. Merton , "Social Structure and Anomie," pp. 185-214 , in
Social Theory and Soczal Structure (New York , 1968).
3. As Adam Ulam notes in The Fall of the American University (Lasalle,
Illinois, 1973) , pp. 25 -26 , research was an important feature of prewar
academic life, especially at "Establishment" institutions like Harvard.
However, to a great extent , research was "inner-directed ," i.e. ,
prompted by intellectual curiosity rather than the desire" . .. (to) make
money or . . . to be advanced or retained at a university ." Ignoble or
not , it was precisely these motives which emerged as dominant in the
postwar meritocratic environment.
4 . See Robert Nisbet's The Degradation of the Academic Dogma (New
York , 1971) for a brilliant analysis of the war's impact on academic
values .
5. Rexford G. Tugwell , The Brain Trust (New York, 1968).
Sec , for example, Irving Louis Horowitz , ed. , The Rise and Fall of
Project Camelot ; Studies in the Relationships Between Social Science
and Practical Politics (Cambridge, Mass . , 1967) and George M. Foster,
Tradziz"onal Societies and Technological Change (New York, 1973),
Chapter XIII, pp. 246 -259.
7. Some observers have argued that, as a group, female academicians are
already better prepared for meritocratic competition than the male
c hairmen and professors who have discriminated against them. For a
persuasive, well documented study of academic chauvinism, see Gertrude Ezorsky , "The Fight Over University Women ," New York Review
of Books, Vol. XXI #8 (May 16, 1974) , pp. 32-39.
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